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1 The organic crisis of British
capitalism and race: the experience
of the seventies
John Solomos, Bob Findlay, Simon Jones
and Paul Gilroy
We are witnessing and passively acquiescing in a quiet but hardly bloodless revolution.
The induction of general social disorder, uncensored crime and personal negligence
have replaced more warlike conduct as the painless way to undermine the stability
of the state.
JAMES ANDERTON
The combined assault on English identity and values is neither planned nor fully
understood by its participants; its roots often lie deep in the unconscious. Its main
force stems from the lack of coherent opposition. Too many people are frightened




The central theme of this book is that the construction of an authoritarian state in
Britain is fundamentally intertwined with the elaboration of popular racism in the
1970s.1 x The aim of this introductory chapter is more modest. It offers a frame-
work for examining the relation of 'race' to British decline, and attempts a
periodization of state racism during the seventies. We hope to provide a more
detailed morphology of these transformations in future work.2
The parallel growth of repressive state structures and new racisms has to be
located in a non-reductionist manner, within the dynamics of both the international
crisis of the capitalist world economy, and the deep-seated structural crisis of the
British social formation. This idea links the various chapters which follow. Some
aspects of it have already been developed by others,3 but the argument is far from
complete. What concerns us, therefore, is not to outline a theory of racist ideologies,
but to scrutinize the political practices which developed around the issue of race
during the seventies. We have chosen this approach for two basic reasons. Fir5t, we
believe that it is not possible to understand the complex ways in which state racism
works in British society without looking closely at the ways in which it is reproduced
inside and outside state apparatuses. Second, we feel that it is not possible to see
racism as a unitary fixed principle which remains the same in different historical
conjunctures. Such a static view, which is common in many sociological approaches,
' Superior figures refer to the Notes and references which appear at the end of chapters.
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"We'd better do something quick or WE'LL be
Source: Daily Express, 10 July 1981
Reproduced by permission of Daily Express
unemployed..."
kndcn Expre* Seflic€
The organic crisis of British capitalism ond race 1 I
cannot explain how racism is a contradictory phenomenon which is constantly
transformed, along with the wider political-economic structures and relations of
the social formation.a
l'he function of this chapter is twofold - first, to introduce at a more general,
and therefore theoretical level, themes which will be covered later on, and second,
to explain the way in which certain key concepts have been used. In the second and
third sections we shall attempt to analyse, albeit briefly and schematically, some of
the main shifts in the relation between the various types of state intervention and
the wider organic crisis. Although a number of recent Marxist studies have analysed
the deep economic roots of the present crisis, we think that this is only part of the
story. This is why we emphasize the organic nature of the crisis, meaning by this
that it is the result of the combined effect of economic, political, ideological and
cultural processes. A full historical account ofthese issues has not been attempted
in this book, partly because we feel that this is one area where the recent revival
of Marxist political economy has made a substantive contribution.s Nevertheless,
as a contribution to this debate, we will introduce some discussion of race around
rvhich a fuller historical account may be constructed. In the fourth and fifth
sections we attempt to show how official thinking on violence, law and order, and
race has been closely connected. We establish the origins of these interconnections
in debates about violence which began in the sixties and argue that they have
assumed a particularly sharp and pernicious form during the seventies. This is
3ecause race has increasingly become one of the means through which hegemonic
:elations are secured in a period of structural crisis management. Although as
Chapters 2 and 8 emphasize, we see race as a means through which other relations
ire secured or experienced, this does not mean that we view it as operating merely
es a mechanism to express essentially non-racial contradictions and struggles in
::.;ial terms. These expressive aspects must be recognized, but race must also be
rpproached in its autonomous effectivity.
Racisrn as it exists and functions today cannot be treated simply from a socio-
.'r;icalperspective: ithastobelocatedhistoricallyandintermsof thewider
r;:e*tures and relations of British society. The historical roots of racist practices
r:-Jrin the British state, the British dominant classes, and the 'British'working class,
e: ;eep and cannot be reduced to simple ideological phenomena. They have been
:,:'r.iilioned, if not determined, by the historical development of colonial societies
r::ch s'as central to the reproduction of British imperialism.o This process
x.erated a specific type of 'nationalism' pertinent in the formation of British
:rrsses long before the 'immigration' issue became a central aspect of political
r-,o-[ ::rse.'
Se are arguing for a conception of racism which is historical rather than socio-
-t:u'n.a.. Just as Marxist accounts of the historical links between the specific political
r..x:-l:es concentrated in the 'capitalist state' and the course of capitalist develop-
um: tave emphasized the dynamic nature of political relations, so we would argue
trriu 
=. 
links between racism and capitalist development are complex, and con-
dfucei b1' the specific socio-political circumstances in which they function. We
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want to emphasize that ethnic and racial forms of domination are shared not by
exogenous mechanisms, but by the endogenons political economic forces which
are dominant in the specific societies under study.8 It follows from this basic
proposition that racial forms of domination do not develop in a linear fashion but
are subject to breaks and discontinuities, particularly in periods ofcrisis which
produce qualitative changes in all social relations.
This is how we see the period of the seventies in Britain.
The reorganization of the international division of labour and black workers in
Britain
It is important to situate the question of racism in Britain today in a broader
international context.e Although these links are often ignored in studies of'race
relations'we refuse to study them at our peril. A recent report from the OECD is
worth mentioning in this respect, since it points out in a very clear way the need
for 'supporting policies'to be instituted to help out national states facing acute
social problems. The message contained in this report was tellingly summarized in
a Financial Times leader called 'searching for consensus':
Not only the pre-summit row over U.S. interest rates, but also the eight days of
street fighting in London, Liverpool and Manchester, have shown that consensus,
whether on the international stage or at home, is becoming in dangerously short
supply.'o
It should be made clear that what happened in Britain over the period 1979-8r
cannot be reduced to some immutable laws of history which apply to every society
at every point of time. Such a reduction avoids difficult problems by attributing
the type and direction of the changes occurring to an outside force, some inevitable
determinant of all social relations. It is as methodologically distant from a critical
Marxist account as the liberal-democratic pluralist framework which dominates
the research on race relations in Britain.lr In opposition to it, we suggest that
while the specific forms of racism which exist in Britain today have been shaped by
endogenous political-economic forces, they have also been transformed in ways
which can only be understood as the result of the qualitative changes in Britain's
international position over the last three decades.
Although the disarticulation in labour demand and supply in most European
countries since 1973-4 has shown how fragile the position of migrant workers
really is,r' there is a much longer history of decline which underlies the experience
of these workers in the period after 1945.Indeed, from a longer-term perspective
'the end of the migrant labour boom'13 does not look as surprising as it may have
done a few years back.
The reproduction of racial and ethnic divisions has been a central feature of
accumulation in the post-war period precisely because of the requirement that
labour from the colonies and other peripheral economies be used to reorganize the
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main industrial sectors of the advanced industrial economies. This is a proposition
which has received strong support from a number ofhistorical and sociological
studies of specific societies,la and from a theoretical perspective.ls But it has
tended to be used as a mechanical model of explanation, with the assumption that
it is applicable to every situation, and therefore very little advance has been made
in substantiatinghistorically the variable patterns of absorption and exclusion of
migrant labour as they have taken shape in the main European societies. We still
have no clear idea ofhow a'historically-concrete and sociologically-specific account
of distinctive racial aspects"6 can help us to develop a more critical perspective
towards the analysis of racism and its modalities in late capitalism. The elements
of such an approach exist in abstract formulations but the process of applying
them to concrete situations in an experimental fashion has hardly begun.
Take, for example, recent advances in developing critical accounts of how, in
their specific modalities, imperialism, the state and the restructuring of the labour
process have shaped the articulation of the different levels of the accumulation
process.lT A number ofthese approaches, notably those ofthe debate on the state,
have been usefully applied to the study of migration and the processes through
which the segmentation of the working class takes place. Yet no attempt has been
made to link such studies to issues such as racial/ethnic divisions, which have
tended to be consigned to the study of ideologies rather than political economy.
Because of this neglect, the field of race has been dominated by narrow sociological
studies, and no grounded attempts to locate it within a political economy frame-
work have materialized.
The reorganization of the international division of labour has only belatedly
been analysed from the perspective of its implications for migrant workers, although
a number of general accounts of a shift from 'labour-import' to 'capital+xport'
strategies have been written.ls Such accounts have, however, not been balanced by
a parallel attempt to draw out the mediations between the international environ-
ment and the operation of individual nation states. A few illuminating remarks
have been made by Stuart Hall,le Immanuel Wallerstein,2o Sivanandan2l and
Marios Nikolinakos.22 But their accounts have tended to remain at too general a
level of abstraction to be directly applicable to the contempolary transformations
of the politics of migration and ethnic/racial divisions. What they do suggest,
however, is the need to apply criteria of historicity and of combined though
uneven development to the study of ethnic/racial patterns of domination in late
capitalism. Wallerstein, in his historical account of capitalist development, argues
correctly that Marxists have too often failed to locate racial, national, or regional
divisions materially, and consigned them all too simply to the ubiquitous super-
slructure. He himself proposes that such divisions are not exogenous but endog-
enous to the rearticulation of nation and class which capitalist development
brought about:
The development of the capitalist world-economy has involved the creation of all
the major institutions of the modern world: classes, ethnic/national groups,
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households, and the 'state'. All of these structures postdate, not antedate,
capitalism; all are a consequence, not cause. Furthermore, these various institutions
in fact create each other. Classes, ethnic/national groups and households are
defined by the state, and in turn create the state,, shape the state and transform
the state. It is a structured maelstrom of constant movement, whose parameters
are measurable through the repetitive regularities, while the detailed constellations
are always unique.23
This conception of the interplay between the state and the reproduction of ethnic/
racial differences is important because it situates the operation of the international
context within the complex reality of the political and economic forces in each
national formation. Moreover it firmly locates the capitalist state as a central
mechanism for the articulation and reproduction of such divisions. It thus prob-
lematizes botl narrow sociological models which take the nation state for granted,
and reductionist frameworks which only 'explain'race through displacing it on to
economic forces. In his work on mugging, and the position of race and class in the
caribbean, Stuart Hall has developed a similar account of how the reproduction
of hegemony is not a stable process but is constantly reshaped and undermined by
the operation of the wider socio-economic structures.4
It would be against the line of thought developed in this book to think that
these general arguments are directly applicable to the complex history of black
labour in Britain, both before and after I 948. A number of mediations have to be
introduced if we are to analyse how the patterns of inclusion' and ,exclusion, of
black workers have been transformed over time. Certainly a global view of labour
migration is important if we are to break down the idea that racism is an 'aberrant
epiphenomenon introducing a dysfunction into the regular social order,.2s It is
also a means by which one can counter what has been called a 'loss of historical
memory' and understand the way in wlfch the imperialisms of the past and present
secure the transformation of racist practices. According to Stuart Hall the develop-
ment of racism as a political force has to be understood, sui generis:
It's not helpful to define racism as a 'natural' and permanent feature 
- 
either of
all societies or indeed of a sort of universal 'human nature'. It's not a permanent
human or social deposit which is simply waiting to be triggered off when the
circumstances are right. It has no natural and universal law of development. It does
not always assume the same shape. There have been many significantly different
racisms 
- 
each historically specific and articulated in a different way with the
societies in which they appear. Racism is always historically specific in this way,
whatever common features it may appear to share with other social phenomena.
Though it may draw on the cultural and ideological traces which are deposited in
a society by previous historical phases, it always assumes specific forms which arise
out of the present 
- 
not the past 
- 
conditions and organisation of society. . . . The
indigenous racism of the 60s and 70s is significantly different, in form and effect,
from the racism of the 'high' colonial period. It is a racism 'at home', not abroad. It
is the racism not of a dominant but of a declining social formation.26
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This is an argument which will be developed at length, and with reference to con-
crete issues, later on. But from the perspective of this section it is important to
emphasize the issue raised in the last sentence, about the specificity of the sixties
and seventies 
- 
the period of decline and restructuring. In the context ofblack
settlement in Britain this conceptualization allows us to locate the shaping.of
racial segmentation in the labour market, residential segregation,legislation to
control immigration, and the policing of black working-class areas, as related aspects
of organic crisis in the present period. Racisms structure different areas of social
life. It is the development of new forms of racism in a phase of relative decline that
a materialist analysis of the current situation must explain.
In broad terms, the post-I948 experience of black workers in Britain can be
periodized according to three phases: (a) the period of immediate response by the
state to the wave of black settlement, leading up to the control of immigration
strategy promulgated by the 1962 Act; (b) the articulation of various policy
packages to deal with the 'problems' which were seen as associated with a black
presence, e.g. in education, the social services, employment, which dominated
official thinking up till the early seventies; (c) a period of 'crisis management'
which has operated since the early seventies and which prioritizes the option of
control and containment of forms of black resistance against racial domination.
These phases cannot be said to be discrete, and there is clearly a case to be made
that there was a fair amount of overlap between them. Nonetheless, it seems
useful to think of the post-war period as one of contradictory changes in the
economic and political forms of racial domination, rather than as one of linear
patterns of sociological integration.2T This periodization is also helpful because it
elucidates links with changes in other aspects ofsocial life, and with the trans-
formation of Britain's economic position in the international arena.
During the latter two periods, as public concerl has focused increasingly on
the complex definition of social problems and the management of the crisis, we
have seen quite fundamental redefinitions of the racial dimension of politics and a
reshaping of the national and urban political economy. Although these processes
must be given some degree of autonomy, it is still possible to look at the mechan-
isrns which have secured an articulation between the different levels. In rejecting
reductionist forms of analysis we do not believe that it is at the same time
necessary to construct race as a completely autonomous factor, with no relation to
olher areas of social reality. We contend that the international context, the material
=ality of a 'declining social formation', and subsequent transformations in the role
of the state, have contributed to the form and trajectory of racisms which have in
:urn- shaped these relations during the seventies. The following sections concen-
'!:r.te on these issues, and introduce the main themes which govern the concrete
irmorical analyses presented in the rest of the book.
kisut and authoritarianism in the seventies
The period which this book covers cannot easily be abstracted from what went on
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before or, more importantly, from the developments which we are witnessing in the
first phase of the eighties. Yet there is little doubt that the seventies was a period of
major changes in a number of areas, not least in the political field, which will have
profound implications for the position of black people in British society. The
struggles around the policies of the Conservative Government during 197 I 
-4 , the
breakup of the hnity' of the Iabour Party during the late seventies, the series of
expenditure cuts imposed by both Labour and Conservative administrations, the
massive rise in unemployment since 1976, and the imposition of a neo-conservative
politics since 1979, may all seem to be issues which are only tangentially related to
race as such. But they all have to be looked at as part of the wider politico-economic
environment which has conditioned the ways in which race has been experienced.2s
Take for example the role of the state in its various attempts to control vital areas
of the economy, social welfare expenditure and the repressive apparatuses. A11 of
these changes have been straped by the uneven development of political and econ-
omic relations during the seventies, and also by changes in the balance of the state
apparatuses themselves. Economic policies have been framed around the various
stages of the developing organic crisis of accumulation which Britain experienced
during this period. But they have also been shaped by a variety of political
struggles and other factors which cannot be reduced to a simple reflection of the
accumulation processes. The history of'the cuts'in state expenditure, an uneven
process which went through various stages throughout the seventies, illustrates
these twin processes,2e as does the articulation of legal mechanisms in the field of
industrial relations to the management of organized labour.so we shall discuss later
how both policing and the 'race-relations industry'have undergone a parallel process
of restructuring.
Most late capitalist states have gone through a period which Poulantzas and
othcrs3l have defined in terms of two shifts: first,a progression from the inter-
ventionist state of the post-war period to the technocratic state of today, which not
only acts to meet the needs ofprocesses ofproduction and reproduction but is a
constituent element of these processes; and second, the articulation of more
specific and organized forms of politically orchestrated domination in every field of
social life, and the development in embryonic form of a state authoritaianisrn.
This analysis is of course abstract and is not meant as an explanation of what has
actually happened to every national state formation. As an analytical tool, however,
it can be productive, at least in tryingto make sense - from a theoretical perspec-
tive 
- 
ofwhat has actually happened in Britain overthe last decade, and although
this approach has been criticized for being determinist, this criticism does not hold
for all the applications of thismodel to concrete situations.32 Against the back-
drop of the fundamental changes which the last two decades have wrought on the
political realm, it is important to analyse such developments theoretically as well
as historically. The first problem with using a term like authoritarian lyz is that it
carries a conspiratorial connotation. Although it should be clear from the concrete
analyses of specific state agencies which are contained in later chapters that such a
viewpoint could not be further from our own, it may be a useful exercise to state
our theoretical distance from it here.
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We see the period of the seventies as one in which there was a rapid development
of rational forms of direct state control as opposed to more indirect forms of social
control. In other words, it is the articulation of an 'all-pervasive state regulation
of social and economic processes',33 rather than partial and intermittent forms of
state intervention, which characterizes this period. This has been shown in relation
to race-relations legislation by John Lea, who argues that even in the sixties there
was a shift in emphasis from integration to social control.s In a wider theoretical
and comparative framework this has also been substantiated by the work of
Poulantzas, Offe and Habermas.3s Offe argues that the current form of the state
can best be characterizedby the term the 'crises of crisis management':
Such a definition predisposes one to favour a processual concept of crisis. Crises,
then, are developrnental tendencies that can be confronted with 'counteracting
tendencies', which means that the outcome of crises is quite unpredictable. More-
over, this processual form of crisis concept has the advantage of making it possible
to relate the crisis-prone developmental tendencies to characteristics of the system;
in other words, such developmental tendencies need not be seen as catastrophic
events of contingent origin.36
In addition, this model allows us to see the specific nature of the state's role today,
rvhich is by no means monolithic. Just as the economic crisis of the seventies has
taken a unique form - stagflation - so state authoritalianism is a novel phenomenon
in capitalist democracies (though as a tendency it has a long history), corlesponding
neither to the normal liberal-democratic state form, nor to fully exceptional forms
Iike Fascism. Democracy has not been recomposed on a new basis, but neither has
the crisis been resolved through the wholesale elimination of democracy. What we
have seen, as Poulantzas puts it, is:
Intensified state control over every sphere of socio-economic life combined with
radical decline of the institutions of political democracy and with draconian and
n:ultiform curtailment of so-called 'formal' liberties, whose reality is being
discovered now that they are going overboard.3T
This schematization of the recent history of the state serves to demonstrate that
as hegemony becomes contested, in its various sites of operation in civil society and
state, power becomes more concentrated and centralized as the dominant bloc
seeks to insulate itself from popular struggles. Since the state is structured by the
;apacity of one or several classes to realize their specific interests, it is to be
expected that policies will not be uniform, but result from a sometimes contra-
iiictory series of decisions and non-decisions taken to meet perceived or real
Jangers.
Because political authority in late capitalism is structured so that it selects
ryrecific outcomes from an infinite number of possibilities, the state is able to
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construct a hierarchy of 'political needs' that have to be dealt with. In the case of
the restructuring of the social services and the nationalized industries in the period
since 1971 , what we have seen is not a uniform reduction of levels of expenditure
but a hierarchical ordering of priorities in relation to the twin axes of ,reducing
inflation' and 'increasing profitability'. of course, this process has not taken place
in a linear manner but has taken shape through a series of negotiations ald retreats
v',hich have involved shifts and relocations in the formulation of heeds'.
The state has not been totally successful in its attempt to harmonize contra-
dictory social and economic processes. we can see this from its growing interven-
tions in the processes by which crisis is ideologically constructed. The state which
n 1945 presented itself in the guise of a more humane and socially responsible
capitalism, has been pulled into the processes of crisis management. Ravaged by a
crisis it cannot control, it is in a sense boxed in, between the inner limit of
inadequate response and the outer limit of excessive response. The case of unem-
ployment is a clear example of how this politicization of the state tends to over-
flow from the political system as such. The state responds to the issue of
unemployment reactively rather than positively: it attempts to prevent a .problem,
from becoming too 'serious' rather than to actually produce solutions. This has
produced fresh contradictions within the state itself:
Increasingly the state has appeared to absorb all the pressures and tensions of the
economic and political class struggle into itself, and then been torn apart, by its
conspicuous lack of success 
- 
progressively, the various crises take the form of ageneral crisis of the state as a whole, and rapidly reverberate upwards from theirinitial starting-points to the higher levels of the legal and political order itself.3s
This tendency for the state structures to become ensnared by the processes which
they themselves set in motion has a long history 
- but what makes it so pervasive
in the current situation in Britain is an overall historical legacy of economic failure
and social disintegration. It is this relative paralysis of the state and the fracturing
of mechanisms of social control which has produced a new articulation between
the state and racism today. But before we examine this in detail, it is necessary to
say something more about the ways in which the sharpening of the crisis, and its
articulation to more precise and extensive forms of intervention, has been
experienced at the ideological level.
we have argued that the current phase of restructuring the state has to be
looked at against the background of the intractable and organic nature of the crisis
facing British capital, and that the difficult relationship between class power, class
conflict and political forms must be understood from a perspective on the inter-
national nature of the crisis and the specific ways in which it is reproduced in
Britain. These observations point to the fact that the state cannot rely on some
simple form of economic intervention to overcome it. This is confirmed by the
ways in which neo-conservative ideologies are shifting the locus of crisis causation
to the social and political sphere, and by the general inability to develop policies
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n'hich allow Britain to 'live within its means'.3' Precisely because 'depression,
inflation or other disasters can bring down a government',4o the organizing prin-
''iples underlying state intervention cannot ignore the need to maintain the con-
ditions of accumulation, but neither can the state ignore for long the necessity to
organize consent. The problem ofhow to negotiate a balance between economic
needs and legitimacy has become the central issue of neo-conservative thinking.
Thus according to Lord Hailsham:
The symptoms of our malaise may be economic, may show themselves in price
rises, shortages and industrial disputes. But underlying the symptoms is a disease
shich has destroyed democracies in the past, and the causes of that disease are not
economic. They are moral and political and constitutional, and in order to cure it
re must reorganise them as such.al
The simplicity of this argument is a bit misleading: the medical metaphor not only
tretrays a fear of the depths of the British crisis, it also indicates a suspicion of the
rocial elements which make up the society. The economic crisis is seen as a symptom
rith much deeper roots in the social fabric of the'nation'. So, on the one hand, we
have to look at the metaphors which make the crisis comprehensible and, on the
other, the periodization of the elements of the crisis as such.
One of the threads which connects the progression from more secure forms of
political regulation and technocratic control is the position of'race' and the
practices which it has generated in the experience of crisis. This is why we need to
ree how the politico-social field has been structured by shifts in material and ideo-
bgical relations which have constructed race as a pertinent, political force. Precisely
because the state has extended its areas of functioning to cover 'moral', 'political'
rmd 'constitutional' issues, it has become possible to bring about a racialization of
Irere policies in all areas of social life. We shall see that labour market policy is
Dot lhe only area in which the issue ofrace has taken on a central role in planning.
The restructuring ofthe state is not disconnected from the contradictions
funanent in and between structures, neither does it have a predictable outcome. It
fo part of an ongoing struggle to impose cohesion in the face of contestation. The
sbstantial transformations of the state during the seventies are not simply an
ourcome of the changes in the economy. To say this would be to confuse long'term
tcadencies with the immediate causes of change within the state. So it is important
to re that the crisis which Britain faced during the seventies, and faces today, is
e crisis of hegemony, an'organic crisis'to use Gramsci's terminology.az Its content
fo not reducible to a cyclic economic crisis in the traditional sense, or a 'crisis of
- - political system'in the narrow sense. It consists rather of profound changes in
rt balance of forces, in the class struggle and in the configuration of the class
rGiances. It is visible in the emergence of new social forces and a specific represen-
trtbn of these changes in the form of crisis management within the state itself.
Ihis is demonstrated by recent work on the reorganization of state policies during
6c seventies whicha3 discusses the complex ways in which the recognition of
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Britain as a 'declining social formation'has affected the development of official
responses to real and perceived problems. It is important to understand, therefore,
that in terms of both its ideological construction and its material functioning, the
state itself is becoming a factor in the reproduction of the organic crisis. Conse-
quently, it is difficult to substantiate the idea that the state can act as a liberal-
democratic arbitrator sorting out problems and providing remedies for dysfunctions
This is clearest in the field of economic interventions, and the protracted battle
to restructure the relation between the state and the economy which has taken
place over the last two decades. It can also be viewed in the areas of education,
urban and social policy.a Here too the state is increasingly having to cope with a
situation which requires a transformation of its own powers to deal with changes
in society as a whole: it is in this sense that it is wrong to see the incipient form
of authoritarianism which is taking shape as a 'strong state', since it is the outcome
of a dialectical interplay between changes in the political field as well.
Following arguments developed by Poulantzas, Jessop and Foucault,4s we see
the seventies as a period during which the following tendencies beconte manifest
(though it should be emphasized that they have by no means reached maturity).
First, there has been a rapid concentration ofpolitical power in the executive
coupled with confusion over the roles ofexecutive, legislative andjudicial
powers. This has entailed constant intrastate wrangling over the competence of
apparatuses associated with these power centres. Second, the decline in the role of
bourgeois political parties and the ideological basis on which these parties were
founded has accelerated. Third, the political freedoms which have been associated
with the ideology of liberal democracy have been severely qualified. This has
required shifts in the ideological and repressive apparatuses ofthe state, but also a
reorganization of what Foucault has called the 'micro-physiology of power' or
symbolic force. As Poulantzas argues:
We know that the process corresponds to a considerable redeployment of the
legal-police network, which, in a new form, duplicates, props up, supports and
extends the capillary diffusion of the circuits of social control: the power of the
police, preliminary administrative investigations, control by the various measures
of assistance and surveillance, interpenetration of these circuits and the police
apparatus . . . centralisation of files and intelligence thanks to advances in electro-
nics, duplication of the official police by private surveillance networks. In a
certain sense, this involves a lifting of the traditional boundaries between the
normal and the abnormal (i.e. supposedly 'anti-social' elements); thus, control is
shifted from the criminal act to the crime-inducing situation, from the pathological
case to the pathogenic surroundings, in such a way that each citizen becomes, as
it were, an a priory suspect or a potential criminal.a6
These transformations cannot be documented in detail here. But it is sufficient in
this context to point out that the history of policing and legal relations in the
seventies substantiates the claims made by Poulantzas and Foucault. We have
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witnessed not a simple extension of repression, but a recomposition of relations of
power at all levels of society.aT Although the more overt forms of 'social control'
are orchestrated by the police, it is important to note that the whole of society is
constituted as a field of social relations structured in dominance.What were once
tendencies have taken institutional fonir during the last few years.
Political debates over the July 1981 uprising have introduced a new range of
possible outcomes which demand reassessment of the balance between social
control and reform. However, given the objectives of this book we shall not analyse
this question further in the abstract. Instead we shall attempt to show the mechan-
isms through which the presence of black people in Britain has become constructed
ideologically as a national problem, thereby rendering them subject to specific and
intense forms of control and repression. These themes must be related to the ways
in which the developing organic crisis has been expressed as, and defined by, a
'crisis of race relations'. The power of racial symbols and signification has had a
profound impact on how the 'crisis of society' is perceived.
Political violence, law and order and the 'enemy within'
The construction of race as a 'problem' has not come about by evolutionary means.
It has emerged from a whole series of events: struggles, breaks, and discontinuitiesa8
which have characterized the development of organic crisis. Before we move on to
the specific ways in which race articulates or does not articulate to specific phases
of the crisis, we must comment on the ideological axis of these struggles - law
and order.
In a recent discussion of the policing of the working-class city Phil Cohen argued
that: 'The current crisis in the policing of the working class city has become a crisis
of legitimacy for the bourgeois public realm as a whole.'ae The experience of the
various debates over the growth of a violent society, the breakdown oflaw and
order, and the erosion of trust in legitimate order demonstrate this.
Since the sixties, these debates have functioned less as a way of actually changing
rhe situation, i.e. by getting rid of the problem, than as a way of negotiating a more
tundamental contradiction: the apprehension of crisis itself.so The concern with
riolence and law and order is easier to understand if we avoid a simple social
control model, and see political and legal institutions as arenas in which the balance
between social classes is constructed.sl It would be a mistake to interpret popular
concern with violence and law as a simple diversionary measure designed to secure
legitimacy by creating a 'false consciousness'. As we have argued above, the devel-
opment of common-sense images of social phenomena is best understood from a
historical perspective, since they are always discontinuous and contradictory. This
b because we treat ideology as a material relation which is both determined by and
:eacts upon the wider social relations. We therefore distance ourselves from
uranipulative conceptions of ideological relations and emphasize the need to under-
nand the links between 'popular' concerns and the everyday experience of reality.
This is how we see the function of ideologies of race and law in the context of the
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present crisis.s2 The detailed account of the changes in police practices over the
last decade has been left for a later chapter, but a few preliminary remarks are
necessary at this stage.
The sixties provided a complex of new issues which has rightly led people to
see them as a watershed in the development of British society.s3 It is striking how
in this period 'violence" 'law and order' and 'permissiveness'became central
features of the discourses of all political parties and of the media, eventually being
articulated in common sense as threats to 'British' society.s
In his discussion of the role of the media in the representation of violence
Chibnal periodizes the sixties in the following way:
The notion of the 'violent society'is to be seen to result from the convergence of
a criminal violence theme, originating irr the mid-sixties, and a political violence
theme which developed a few years later.ss
The construction of these themes in political discourse is only partly reducible to
the role of the media;we must ielate them to transformations in the wider politico-
economic framework. In this perspective, the sixties represent what Gramsci called
a condensation ofcontradictions at all levels ofsociety. This placed violence,
permissiveness and later race on the agenda of popular politics. This was also the
period in which the post-waf consensus over the role of the state in economic and
social policies began to break down. It presents a clear example of a crisis of
hegemonic relations at the political level.s6 As Stuart Hall and his colleagues have
shown, atthough the sixties are sometimes represented as the high points of the
.permissive society', they are also a period which saw important changes leading to
greater separation of decision-making from popular control, and a shift towards an
authoritarian response to so-called'threats'to society. 'Permissiveness'in this
sense was a double-edged development, which contained the seeds of authoritar-
ianism even within a liberal discourse. It was one aspect of a new popular politics
wlich defined both 'the people' and their desires: 'permissiveness' was not what
'the people'wanted.
The period of Wilsonism from 1964 to l97O is perhaps the most interesting from
this angle, since it is also during these years that race became a cole theme in
wider political discourse. The 'wilson experiruent" with its detailed plans for
transforming the economy, developing further social provisions, and bringing
Britain through a new technological revolution, has always been difficult terrain for
political historians of the left.s7 It was, after all, a period which the left had
welcomed as the dawn of a new eta in 1964, and which ended in a dismal defeat
in the 1970 election. It seemed to represent the end of the road for the post-wal
model of social-democratic change, and yet, ironically, it confirmed the fact that
the basic dilemmas which Britain faced could not be overcome by the implemen'
tation of technocratic models from the top. The Heath Govermrent lealned this
bitter lesson when in 1971-3 it attempted to run the country on the basis of a
concerted attack on the 'power' of the trade unions.ss But it was Wilson's earlier
failures which introduced the notion that ours was not simply an economic
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problem, but a deep malaise which had taken root in the whole of society.
The idea that 'the nation' is diseased and slowly destroying itself is not new; it
has been a recurrent theme in British political discourse. What was new in the
sixties was that the threat came tq be conceptualized as the 'enemy within' rather
than a model of subversion from without.se This shift had profound implications
for the way black people were perceived, and it reverberated right across the
political field. The period 1964-70 witnessed three developments which had
brought it about: (a) a growth in forms of extra-parliamentary organizations,
particularly among the young, which were outside the traditional channels of
political participation, e.g. the student movement, the anti-Vietnam war movement,
and on a wider scale the development of mass-based youth subcultures;6o(b) the
development of rank-and-file movements within the trade unions which took up
a more combative position in both traditional trade union struggles and in wider
political issues;61 (c) from 1969 the situation in Northern Ireland developed in the
direction of a fundamental polarization between the Catholic and Protestant
communities, and the British army was used directly as a mechanism of control.s2
Each of these developments had its own specific impact. At a more general level,
the categories of crime, sexuality and youth were the raw materials from which
the image of the violent society63 was constructed. These three issues can be used
to organize thinking about the transformations that took place in the sixties, and
which were to condition how the theme of 'enemies within' would develop in the
seventies.
The threat posed to the nation by trade union 'militants's emerged into popular
politics during the sixties. Its growing resonance reflects the development of class
struggle during this period, particularly when compared to the long boom from
1948 to 1963. More than that, it embodies the decline of the hegemonic political
institutions of social democracy, which had achieved a relative class peace during
the immediate post-war period. Political representation of the Seamen's Strike of
1966 and the struggles over the reform oftrade union legislation during 1968-9
i[e two clear cases of this process, which is also visible in numerous localized
:ases.6t The general trend is clear:
Time and again, in the succeeding decade, the class struggle was to be reconstructed,
ideologically, in these terms: the conspiracy against the nations;holding the nation
:o ransom; the stark contrast between the subversive clique and the innocent worker
end his family 
- 
the seducers and the seduced.66
Tlre unspoken meaning of this discourse on trade unions was that they had come to
erercise too much'power'and, in doing so, to threaten the legitimacy of the state
,r'-rtlf. These ideas governed the electoral campaigns of 1970 and 1974 ('who rules
rte country?'). They have also been a crucial element in the appeal of neo-conser-
utit-e ideologies in the late seventies. However, terms such as 'militants' and
litators'have become vehicles for a more generalized phobia about who the
lnrernies of society' actually are.
The fundamental move away from the social-democratic consensus was not limited
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to the field of working-class struggles. It involved strategic shifts at a number of
other levels, including the role of parliamentary institutions, the bureaucracy, the
police, and the local authorities. The breakup of the post-war coalition demanded
a wholesale rethinking of the function of democratic institutions. This was urged
on by the fear that 'too much' democracy could lead to an overload of demands
on a state already weakened by both the period of relative economic instability,
and the disturbaaces experienced in the late sixties. In a double sense the years
leading up to the seventies were a time of transition:
Politically, in Britain, as elsewhere, the 1968-69 period represents a watershed: the
whole fu'lcrum of society turns, and the country enters, not a temporary and passing
rupture, but a continuous and prolonged state of semi-siege. Its meaning and causes,
then, and its consequences since, have been neither fully reckoned with, nor
liquidated. The political polarisation which it precipitated fractured society into
two camps: authority and its 'enemies'.6?
This 'prolonged state of semi-siege' extended far beyond the shores of Britain, and
indeed in the period 1968-10 it took on a more virulent form in countries such as
France and Italy. But the oppositions were the same, as the well-known report
of the Trilateral Commission on The Cisis of Democracy makes clear:
Everywhere one discovers a complete dissociation between the decision-making
system, dominated by traditional and often quite rhetorical political debate, and
the implementation system, which is the preserve of administrative systems quite
often centralised and strong, but usually even more irresponsive when they are
centralised and strong. This dissociation is the main cause of political alienation
among citizens. It continually nourishes utopian dreams and radical postures and
reinforces opposition to the state.6
Despite numerous appeals to the good old 'common sense'which the British are
supposed to believe in, the fear that political yiolence (i.e. opposition to the state)
would be a reality for some time to come was shared by the major political forces.
Their responses differed, but the fear remained the same.
The beginning of the seventies saw not only the self-recognition of a society
firmly caught in the grip of 'violence', but general fears of a further slide into
lawlessness. The stark choice was between authority and disorder, and there were
calls for immediate action. The prevention of further violence, and the comforting
realization that even within the existing political structures the limits to change
were not firmly set, became the guiding principles of a moral backlash against
'liberalism'and later on against the 'socialism'of the l-abour Party.6e The crisis of
the British way of life came to be seen as pervading the economy, social welfare,
the schools, the prisons, on the streets, and above all the family. Everywhere there
were moles at work. Commenting on 'the red badge of revolution that is creeping
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across Britain' after the Angry Brigade trial, the Evening Standard for once gave
form to the hitherto amorphous threat:
These guerrillas are the violent activists of a revolution comprising workers, students,
trade unionists, homosexuals, unemployed and women striving for liberation. They
are all angry. . . . Whenever you see a demonstration, whenever you see a queue for
slrike pay, every public fbrary with a good stock of socialist literature 
- 
anywhere
would be a good place to look. In short there is no telling where they are.rc
This siege mentality shaped the seventies, in much the same way that the fear of
the future had helped to construct the image of violent society in the sixties. Even
rs the crisis took shape, a new range ofpolitical possibilities had been created by
the realization that these enemies could not be countered by traditional methods.
A new range of strategies and of political outcomes developed with the awareness
rrrt the consensus which had been taken for granted for so long had broken down.
During tlris period, transformations in lhe form of state power were secured
through a political discourse which emphasized the drift of Britistr society into
Yolence' and 'disorder' as a way of securing and reordering the relative balance
between the ideological and repressive roles ofthe state. This is particularly true
oi the ways in which the policing role came to be defined but it was also a clear
tcndency in the fields of industrial relations, social welfare, and race relations.Tr
Both the Heath Government from 1971-4, and the period of the Labour Govern-
cnt (1974-9) saw a popularization of these themes. Though there was simul-
reneously a marked increase in the level of racist violence against black com-
u.rnities 
- 
particularly in the form of 'Paki-bashing' 
- 
the 'violent society' and the
'msequent threat to the existing order of things was not redefined by these
crimes. The issue of the day became 'political violence' rather than the 'criminal
rirlence' of the train robbers and Kray twins. There was a concerted attempt to
unteract the tendency for political action to take a 'violent'form.
In his study of these developments, Britain in Agony , Richard Clutterbuck
provides a clear statement of this position:
Ihe 1970s were agonisingyears for the British people, who felt frustrated, humil-
ired and insecure. By British standards they were exceptionally violent years.
fonomic performance was dismal- British society, instead of drawing together as
i hes more often done in past crises, seemed to become more cantankerous, less
lEo€rous and less compassionate.2
From an explicit social control perspective, Clutterbuck moves on to explore the
-ltion of merely criminal violence to its subversive counterpart:
hlitical violence should be treated more seriously than criminal violence, not only
tquse it has a more arrogant motivation, but also because it affects the lives of
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more of the community. . . . Crimes of violence have increased alarmingly and,
for robbery with violence and rape, the courts will send a man to jail for several
yea-rs. But some magistrates seem to regard political violence as more morally
forgivable than violence for personal gain.T
He attempts to rationalize a perceived change in the 'social basis' of yiolence during
the seventies.B This required commensurate shifts in official discourse and in the
legal-police apparatuses which proceed to counter the danger of'violence'being
used to change the nature of society. Clutterbuck's notion of political violence is
predictably elastic. It includes various forms of dissent which, by their very nature,
involve physical contact with symbols of authority, but which are not intrinsically
violent nor illegal, for example picketing, demonstrations etc. Hall et al.haye
shown in their study of 'mugging'7s that changes in the use of language can be
indicative of wider shifts in the balance of power in society. The passing of notions
like the 'violent society'and'the breakdown of law and order'into common par-
lance reflected transformations in the form of authority, political participation
and social relations which undermined the legitimacy of the state. This process has
taken place while the system has been under severe pressure to'deliver the
goods'.76 These shifts, more than anything else, conditioned the development of
the crisis of political authority which Britain experienced in the seventies.
The battle lines between 'society' and its 'enemies'were more clearly drawn by
the end of the seventies than they had been for decades. This was because responses
to the crisis had taken a specific course, with hegemony being secured on the basis
of ever more loose definitions of the 'enemy within'. The cause of the crisis was
constructed through ideas about externality and criminality which supported a
view of blacks as an 'outside' force, an alien malaise afflicting British society.
It was a short step from seeking to explain the crisis through the unions, to
linking the unions with violence and terrorism.TT By the mid-seventies it was
possible to present blacks as the main danger to society. Anything could be blamed,
so long as it was not capitalism itself. This is a common feature of all legitimation
crises:
Official discourse on law and order confronts legitimation deficits and seeks
discursively to redeem them by denial of their material genesis. Such denial estab-
lishes an absence in the discourse. This absence, the Other, is the silence of a world
constituted by social relations, the reality of which cannot be appropriated by a
mode of normative argument which speaks to and from its own self-image via an
idealised conception of justice.T8
The processes by which this'denial'came to operate by racial differentiation
constitute the main concerns of this book. We aim to show how the material
conditions which have reorganized state racism over the seventies are deeply rooted
tn the presenl, and gain power from the ways in which the organic crisis of British
capitalism is being experienced. This is the argument we want to outline in the last
section of this chapter.
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Making sense of the crisis: the centrality of race
In the wake of the election of the Conservative Government in l9l9 an impottant
official debate has taken place about the position of black people in Britain.D In
Hansarcl one can find many humorous, and some not so humorous, attempts to
produce watertight definitions of exactly who is 'British' and who 'is not'. It is
important that we are clear what such debates are about: they are an aspect of a
much broader attempt to bring some kind of order into a society which is widely
perceiv'ed to be falling apart. They are part of a struggle to 'make sense' of a con-
juncture where all that is good and wholesome seems to be under threat.so It
strould be no surprise that the management of 'good race relations'has assumed a
central and expressive role in the context of this deep-seated crisis. For what is
seen to be at stake in the arena ofrace is the survival ofthe existing order ofthings.
Alfred Sherman, a key figure among right-wing ideologists, has articulated these
t-ears:
The imposition of mass immigration from backward alien cultures is just one
symptom of this self-destructive urge reflected in the assault on patriotism, the
family 
- 
both as a conjugal and economic unit - the Christian religion in public
life and schools, traditional morality, in matters of sex, honesty, public display,
and respect for the law - in short, all that is English and wholesome.8l
The convergence of these fears around the idea of a threatening black presence
(always codified as 'immigration') cannot be reduced to economic factors. Economic
decline preceded popular acknowledgement of crisis, and the expulsion ofblacks as
e solution to national problems has a long history in British political thought. There
is a lot to learn about how material conditions in urban areas have been affected
b1- the crisis, how youth have been affected by unemployment, etc. But none of
*tese areas can properly be understood if we do not acknowledge the ways in
rtich 'race' is used to construct explanations and therefore consent, where crisis
management is the goal of popular politics.
There is no one-to-one correspondence between the 'crisis of race' and the
e*'onomic crisis. Yet race is always present, whether the issue under discussion is
ie growth of unemployment, the role of the police in inner-city areas, or the
:erent 'riots' in a number of major cities. The complexity of this signification
dtmonstrates that the history or racisms in British society cannot be grasped by
e rimple formulaic reduction of races to some immutable economic base. There are
many political/historical factors which condition the relation of race to the current
sisis: all need careful study. The specific circumstances which have generated a
rr-racism are not the result of autonomous racial conflicts any more than they
re the outcome of some abstract laws of capitalist development. The contextual-
crrion of racism today demands analysis of both the racial and non-racial elements
rtich constitute the complex totality within which it funciions:
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At the economic level, it is clear that race must be given its distinctive and 'relatively
autonomous' effectivity, as a distinctive feature. This does not mean that the
economic is sufficient to found an explanation of how these relations concretely
function. one needs to know how different racial and ethnic groups were inserted
historically, and the relations which have tended'to erode and transform, or to
preserve these distinctions through time 
- 
not simply as residues and traces of
previous modes, but as active structuring principles of the present society. Racial
categories alone will not provide or explain these.82
The new morphology of racism which has developed in the seventies needs to be
located against the background of these social relations, which have been dras-
tically reorganized by overall conditions ofcrisis. In every field ofsocial life there
is talk of a crisis, whether it be a temporary fiscal problem or a much deeper crisis
of confidence in the existing order. As far as 'solutions'E3 are concerned, there is
a tendency for ad hoc interventions to be proposed, only to be superseded by new
'problems'. The crisis is insoluble. In this context, race relations have become the
central aspect of attempts to orchestrate politically 
- and therefore to manage 
-
the effects of organic crisis. we must locate the pertinence of 'race' within this
hegemonic struggle and assess its articulation by and with the processes which
secure economic, ideological and political power and domi.nation. A few tentative
propositions follow as to how this should proceed.
The first point is that the term'articulation'needs to be used precisely: as a
concept which means that race joins together the various elements of the organic
crisis and the ways in which they are experienced, but also thatitgives expression
at the political and ideological levels to specific forms of control aimed at black
people.s The meshing of these two meanings can be most clearly seen in relation
to issues of rising unemployment, cuts in welfare expenditure, the crisis of the local
state, and the reorganization ofthe forces oflaw and order. It can be seen at work
in the common-sense neo-conservatism of Sir Keith Joseph, who has been known to
explain the relative decline of the inner cities and some regions 'through' race.85
Popular representation of the recent 'riots' in Bristol, Brixton and July lggl
shows how racial and therefore cultural conflict systematizes and 'explains' both
what is happening, and what might happen in the future.86 In any discussion of
unemployment, for example, race 'slips'in, whereas ten years ago the issue would
have been ignored. Keith Middlemas, a critical Tory thinker, expresses some of
these linkages very clearly:
what will Britain look like after even three years of 2 million unemployed?
Divisions, which for half a century governments have tried to abolish will show
nakedly, between the two geographical Englands, with scotland, wales and North
Ireland on the periphery, like the Italian Mezzogiorno, between those in work and
unemployed; between the mature and the young, between white and black.87
The seamless location of 'white and black' among a wide variety of other divisions
shows the way in which the crisis of the seventies was lived through race. By
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situating race amidst the new realities of structural change and economic uncertainty
that characterize the present conjuncture, it also provides a glimpse of the meaning
of what we have called the new racism.
The quotation from Middlemas reflects one of the main strands of thinking
rbout race in the seventies. It places a number of seemingly 'non-racial' phenomena
on a par with race; with the implication that a solution to the problem of the divi'
sions between white and black must be sought in the wholesale transformation of
the wider conditions which produce and maintain consensus. The other strand in
rhe dominant approach to 'race' in the seventies has been to plesent the 'race
problem' as complised of the black communities themselves. The earlier quotation
liom Alfred Sherman is a good example of how this argument operates, as is the
tbllowing from the Nationality Bill debate:
on ttre issues dealt with by the Bill we are in the grip of forces which, because of
rhe large influx of immigrants into Britain, we now seem unable to control. Racial
riolence is occurring with increasing frequency. The British people are sick at
heart about it all. We badly need honest and forthright politicians to express their
feelings without fear of being condemned on moral grounds.8E
This image of forces beyond the control of ordinary 'British people' is a recurrent
theme in neo-conservative racist 'theory', particularly since it fits in with the
common-sense notion that 'enemies within' - subversive moles - are undermining
the structures of society. It connects with common-sense ideas about why racial
lroblems' arise by identifying 'racial violence' as a result of an illegitimate alien
Fresence. The unseen 'illegal'immigrants are central to this political discourse.
Their very illegality ensures that the British resentment which perpetrates violence
on 'Pakis' is scarcely more than rough justice provoked by foreign interlopers. In
:he context of mass unemployment, deindustrialization, and major outbreaks of
rocial violence, old-style 'Powellism'was not an adequate mode through which
rhe crisis could be rendered intelligible. The late seventies saw a transformation of
::cisr ideology which took account of these new realities, and provided a more
adequate though nonetheless racist interpretation ofwhat was happening. Those
:e*'orkings have taken place along two main lines.
First, there has been a consistent attempt to pin down the dangers posed by
rpecific groups of the black population: the illegals, the young, the militants, the
anemployed, and even the white traitors who identify with an 'alien culture'.8e
This involves recognition of the 'deep social problems' Ievealed by black poverty,
rs well as a concerted attempt to control the antisocial disruption which is con-
ridered to be a consequence of the encounter between 'deprivation' and patho-
hrgical 'immigrant' cultures. Second, a reworking of the concepts of 'nation' and
-;itizen'has taken place which aims to deny even the possibility that black people
Tn share the native population's attachment to the national culture - God, Queen
ed country. This presents the common-sense logic of repatriation or
te-emigration':
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The United Kingdom is the national homeland of the English, Scots, Welsh, Ulster-
men. . . . They wish to survive as an identifiable national entity . . . they have been
willing to work, suffer and die for it. By contrast, for the jet-age migrants, Britain
is simply a haven of convenience where they acquire rights without national
obligation.rc
In crisis conditions, these ideas accord with a mythology which has very deep roots
in English popular culture. The essence ofthis culture has, after all, depended on
a kind of historical forgetfulness which reworks the whole meaning of 'Britishness'
in powerful images of the purity of nation, family and way of life, now jeopardized
by the alien, external wedge. For this culture, even the imagery of the .enemy
within'has a particular resonance in terms of race. Subversion is un-British. The
overall context of a society rapidly becoming conscious of its own shortcomings,
of an entropy of political thought, and the consequent need to .pull together' in
order to survive made the issue of race an important signifier of the crisis. This
may be clearer now that the post-Bristol 'riots'have placed the issues of race and
political violence explicitly on the political agenda. But the roots of the inferential
interconnections go much deeper than the recent events. For over a decade now,
race has been situated, primarily through the discourse of Powellism, as a specific
social problem which has been imposed from outside. el As the bastard children of
Empire set up 'camps' in the heartlands of the mother country, a degree of
internalization has been forced on the reluctant Briton. The blacks are now a
home-grown problem. They are in Britain but not of Britain.
since the first signs of disturbances in major inner-city black areas, the response
of the state has been (a) to prepare the police forces to deal with 'the fire next
time', and (b) to inject fiscal resources into the depressed areas to help with specific
social problems by initiating schemes to deal with what are seen as the 'causes' of
increasing violence and a breakdown oflaw and order.
This is not crude monolithic state strategy, and these two elements of a response
have not always been successfully integrated, nor been applied equally in every case
of locally centred 'race' disturbances. At a macroJevel, however, one should not
underestimate the extent to which the preventive/ameliorative measures are being
backed by a steady strengthening of security forces. Where admitted, this lus
been presented as an insurance measure, rather than the frontline ofdefence. But,
since the 1979 police riot in Southall, it should be clear that this insurance policy
is flexible if not tactical. A leading political cornmentator on The Sunday Times
recently assessed the risks of the present situation in the following way:
What are the risks to British society? It is fanciful, no doubt, to envisage brown
shirts and red brigades coming out on the streets. It may be tendentious to predict
that Britain might join these nations whose most successful members must protect
themselves and their population behind barbed-wire and armed guards. All this is
no doubt a worst-possible scenario. But it is one the government should be
thinking about.e2
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The reality of the'worst-possible scenario'is precisely what has concerned the state
over the last few years. Of course there is still an important gap between Powellisnr,
the extreme right, and state racism - but with the concept of 'humane repatriation'
looming ever more centrally in official thinking on race it need not be conspira-
torial to talk of a shift in the balance of state responses from amelioration to
repression. At the leve1 of everyday practices the oppressive aspects of the state's
role have been felt throughout the seventies; by black youth, by black workers
engaged in industrial disputes, and at the territorial level by whole black com-
munities.e3 What has happened over the last period, particularly since 1976, is a
qualitative strengthening of these repressive measures. This has been demonstrated
time and time again by numerous official and academic studies,q as well as in the
anger of blacks themselves.
These moves can only partially be explained by the tendency for racism to show
a close relation to the tempo of crisis management. Race must be given its own
3utonomous effectivity in any account of the present; it makes every black person
r priori a suspect, a potential criminal, a potential agitator. During the series of
'riots' from early 1980 to July 1981 the fixing of a number of 'causes' to these
:vents within official explanations, located race as one variable among others ,
mcluding social, economic and local issues.es Yet within the popular consciousness,
rnd not just the media, ttre issue of race came to occupy the central role in
rommon-sense accounts of why the riots have taken place in specific areas. The
i aress coverage of the events took a number of forms, some of which will be looked
I rt more carefully later on in the book. But there can be no denying that race, even
! rt *re level of metaphor, was a crucial variable in explanations of the Bristol,
I B.irton and the July l98l 'riots'.e6
I When Enoch Powell asked in a House of Commons debate 'in which town or
I 
"O 
does the honourable Gentleman (Mr Whitelaw) expect the next pitched
I hattle against the police to be fought?', he did not need to make the race dimen-
I *, overt for everybody to understand what he meant.eT Coverage by the Daily
a fuil. Sun, Daily Express and Daily Telegraph during July 1981 needs no elabor-
I o-n. Even the more 'liberal' views of The Financial Times and Guardian place
I EIE supreme among numbers of other factors as the common denominator of the
I ools.q The Financial Times,for example, under the banner headline 'Outbreak of
I u. alien disease', reflected on the events in a typical manner:
I l-ft.e an epidemic of some alien disease, to which the body politic has no immunity,
I oeet riots have erupted in different parts of England during the past ten days. . . .
I t r in a way all the more disturbing that there are so many conflicting explanationsI d Se past week's violence. Riots in different towns seem to have been sparked off
I ts -at 
", 
different factors: in Southall by racial fear and racial hatred; in Liverpool
! pfaps by a tradition of lawlessness and rivalry between police and idle, frustrated
! p-"g"t"rs;in Manchester apparently by imitation of their Liverpool neighbours;
I I perhaps worst of all, in parts of London, by what appears to be pure criminality
I 
- 
greed. For if there are so many forces which are capable of sending hundreds of
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youths onto the rampage 
- 
youths of all races, and living in relatively prosperous
areas such as London, not just suffering from desperate deprivation -then the
problem of restoring order and respect for law may be all the greater.ee
It is worth taking note that this 'alien disease' theme is shared by openly racist
political groups, which have given it an extra edge by greater emphasis on the
cure 
- 
repatriation.l@ However, even when t}te social problems of unemployed or
poor inner-city people are discussed rather than the'immigration problem'per se,
racial signification and explanations gain the upper hand. It should be understood
that there is no necessary contradiction between the institutions of the welfare
state, and the intensification of social control required by crisis management. The
details of the police response to this situation will be discussed later, but it is
useful to outline the state's political responses to the post-Bristol situation.
After the Southall events of April 1979 ,the crisis management approach to race has
taken two forms. One, generally associated with the Labour Party, the Liberals
and a section of the Conservative Party, prioritizes 'social engineering' experiments
aimed at improving the urban environment as well as strengthening law and order;
a second, which is upheld by the majority of the Conservatives and the fringes of
the political right, holds that law and order must come first, and that any reforms
should proceed through the due process of law.rol In the House of Commons
debate on Civil Disturbances held on l6 July l98l the basic features of these
approaches were presented in some detail.
It is important to avoid a binary counter-position where at the level of political
strategies there is either a conspiratorial attempt to control black people or a
policy of social reform.102 For throughout the sixties and seventies race-relations
legislation has been neither completely 'progressive' nor 'socially controlling'. It
reflected both a reform and a control element, which attempted to secure the
'problem' of race as part of an overall political agenda. It is in this complex, and
ultimately contradictory, vray that the response to the growing activism and self-
organization ofblack people is likely to develop over the next decade. As such it
is likely that it will also be subject to contradictory outcomes.lu3 Nevertheless, it
is important to look seriously at the popular alternative which is being advocated
by the right in Parliament and by racist organizations on the streets;that is, the
issue of repatriation. The discourse of repatriation is rooted in the reality of the
present crisis, even though some elements of its ideological construction have
been carried over from the past. It has been restructured and reorganized by the
materiality of the employment crisis, by the thematization of violence, and by
the rapid decline of inner-city areas. The pivot of this rearticulation is the
location of 'racial problems' as historical invariables to the extent that remaking
history ilself becomes a method of ideologically constructing the need for re-
patriation. The 'facts' are taken as given because the last two decades are supposed
to have 'proved' that as the black population grew, violence and disorder became
the order of the day. Traces of black life have been removed from the British past
to ensure that blacks are not part of the British future.
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It is precisely the weight of this history which allows Powell to penetrate the
walls of official thinking even when his 'solutions' are specifically rejected. After
the July 1981 riots he spoke of the inevitability of 'civil war' if the black
population rose in line with his predictiops.'s In rebutting both the Conservative
and [-abour strategies he voiced an alternative view of causation:
The Government and the House will not be serving the country unless they address
themselves to the ultimate reality, the ultimate cause, the sine qua non,withottt
which what we have witnessed and are witnessing could not and would not have
happened. .. . IMr Hattersley] gave three causes -poverty, unemployment and
deprivation. Are we seriously saying that so long as there is poverty, unemployment
and deprivation, our cities will be torn to pieces, that the police in them will be
the objects of attack and that we shall destroy our own environment? Of course
not. Everyone knows that, although those conditions do exist, there is a factor 
-
the factor which the people concerned perfectly well know, understand and appre-
hend, and which unless it can be dealt with 
- 
unless the fateful inevitability, the
inexorable doubling and trebling, of that element of a population can be
avoided 
- 
their worst fears will be fulfilled.los
We have quoted this argument at length because it is important to note the ways in
n'hich even when race is not mentioned in so many words, it is the 'element'
rvhich cements common-sense notions of why violence is increasing, and why the
existing order is under stress. Powell's idea of an 'ultimate cause' intersects with
popular racist notions at the level of everyday experience and becomes a central
neans of explaining why the country is 'going to the dogs'.
Repatriation is not a political strategy that can be put into large-scale practice
tt this particular time, not least because blacks will not countenance it. As the task
'-rf 
policing and managing black working-class areas becomes even more difficult,
:alls for a final solution to the'problem'of race are likely to increase. Sections of
re Conservative Party have already debated the appropriate financial inducement.
But the outcome ofthese struggles cannot be judged from here. Options for state
:.sponses to the 'alienation of black youth'supposedly revealed by 'the riots' are
aiready taking shape.It would clearly be false to argue that the state will respond
lmply through either greater repression or ameliorative measures of social control.
There lt a strong element of both these approaches in proposals being considered
n policy-making channels.rM The unsteady terrain on which the police have been
:,oerating has already led to a reworking of their tactics in inner-city areas.lo?
\r doubt, in time, we shall see the development of policies for all areas of social
;:e which aim to control and contain the 'social'problems which government
:r:licies have done much to reproduce.los Piecemeal responses should not be seen
x :ire guiding principle of all the state's actions in this field. It is incorrect to
r,aintain a modified pluralist framework, whereby each of these responses is seen
rs iuble to negotiation on its own terms, e.g. the current attempts to reform
rr:l-rcing and the development of 'new' policies for the inner-city areas. The trans-
:,:r:nations in the role of the state are structural, and should not be confused with
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the ad hoc policy alternatives which appear in the political arena. The fundarnen-
tal reworking of state policies which took place in the sixties, and accelerated
during the seventies, secured a new balance ofhegemonic relations, a tendency
which we have called authoritarian statism. It is foolish to think of the state as
some kind of immobile object which suddenly awakens to the riots, and could
be swayed either way by sound arguments. Such a situation, if it has ever
exjsted, is not the one which confronts us today. We are faced with a state that is
in the process of fundamental change, which cannot be reduced to a conscious
will, and which is the outcome of complex determinations at all levels of British
society.
As shown in later chapters (particularly Chapters 2 and 8) the restructuring and
strengthening of state racism in the current period has been periodized and punc-
tuated by the operation of racist practices and by the contradictory effects of
crisis management. The aftermath of the recent 'riots' undoubtedly represents
a watershed in the development of state racism, but we should avoid the temp-
tation to tJrink about it in outdated categories. The response ofthe state to the
perceived and real 'dangers' of this period will take novel forms which cannot be
understood through a simple dichotomy of reform/repression. We are likely to see
policies which display a fluid combination of preventive and repressive options,
which will be moved one way or the other according to the balance of forces. The
accelerated pace of development in the 'race-relations industry' over the past few
years is therefore a sign of things to come, as is the intensified policing of working-
class black areas. This is why the choices of resistance and struggle which black
communities are making must not be fitted into narrow models of political action
which assume that liberal-democratic forms of government are the only forms
possible in late capitalism. They must be seen for what they are: a response which
has been conditioned by popular racism, state racism and the intensity of the racist
attacks against black communities in many inner-city areas.loe
The everyday struggles of blacks against the racism of capitalist command are
the ground on which the state and its agencies will attempt to develop mechanisms
of containment and counter-insurgency. They also supply 'facts' from which new
elements of racist ideologies will be constructed, at the level of official discourse
and on the streets. They raise issues which have a wider importance than the
immediate scope of the struggles themselves. As Stuart Hall remarked, in his account
of the recent riots:
The police-black front is the front line: policing and the drift into authoritarian
social control are front-line issues. Nevertheless, responding to the riots is not a
matter of defending civil rights or of 'being nice to black people'. Rioting and civil
disorder grow out of and reflect back on what is happening to the working class
as a whole and to society as the crisis cuts into the latter at all levels. The riots are
only the outward, if dramatic, symptoms of this inner unravelling of our social,
political and community life.1lo
In this wider, deeply social sense, the long-term implications of recent events are
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likely to be profound. They show that the articulation of race to the organic crisis
has resulted in important contradictions for the state, which will sharpen as the
crisis involves more and more groups in the front line. The problems this poses for
the state are being assessed within various state agencies, with the help of the race'
relations industry. The left has hardly attempted to sift the complex issues involved,
let alone think about them. Yet without carefully working through the issue of race
and crisis, it is inconceivable that they will come up with an adequate response to
the development of repressive policies, and popular authoritarianism.
Conclusion: stepping into the eighties
Whole histories remain to be written about the experience of black workers in this
country. In this book we aim to produce some elements of that history, which we
hope will form a basis for further research. Because of our deep dissatisfaction
with the dominant approaches to 'race-relations theory', which tend to concen-
trate on either narrow empirical studies or descriptive interview surveys, we have
attempted to locate our own work within a broader theoretical framework which
Jerives much from recent Marxist discussions on the nature of contemporary
capitalism. We are aware that this approach has its own problems, but we feel it
:o be a necessary step in the current context of debates on racism.
Broadly speaking, there are four conclusions which can be drawn from our
triscussion so far, some of which will be elaborated in the chapters which follow.
The first step in breaking down the dominant conceptions of 'race relations' is to
lor:ate histories of racism firmly within a framework which establishes that it is
=produced by endogenous political-economic forces, not by exogenous mechan-
irns. Second, it is important to see that the changes in the form of racism during
Se seventies were forged in the crucible of the struggles waged by black people
4ainst the patterns of domination imposed by the manner of their incorporation
mro the relations of production, as well as by the practices involved in their political
m.i cultural forms of resistance. Third, we have argued that although the ways in
rtich the 'crisis of race relations' has been conceptualized cannot be separated
iun the general crisis of hegemony which has afflicted British capitalism, it would
lc r-rong for analysis to stop there. We need to analyse race in terms of its specific
:forms at different periods of time in order to see how it articulates - or not - with
,otfrer social relations. Fourth, we argue that in a context of emerging authoritar-
,-mrm and a strengthening of repressive agencies, there is little hope that reformist
crregies will fundamentally improve the material conditions which confront black
gacle in their daily struggle to survive in British society.
The full development of these arguments is beyond the scope of this book, but
c do believe that individual chapters have developed them to a sufficiently high
hd to sponsor new areas of concrete investigation and to illuminate a number of
ryonant phenomena articulated to the structural position of black people in thehirant social relations. We would not claim to have 'finished'this discussion,
h ir does seem to us that the questions we raise need to be considered more
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seriously than theyhave been in the past. If this discussion takesplace we will
have served a useful role in sensitizing others to an understanding ofboth the deep
roots of racism in Britain, and the need to move beyond simple reform in order to
overcome racism. This is why in the midst of the depressing story we tell, we feel
able to maintain some optimism about what can be achieved if the oppressed organ-
ize to change the conditions of their daily existence. The experience of the black
masses during the decade of the seventies has alerted us to what underlies the
superficial appearance of the British state: namely that the normal processes of
political authority, when they cannot proceed by co-operation, proceed through
confrontation, and, at a higher level, through the state's orchestration and legiti.
mation of repression. This is a very dangerous time, and those who are interested
in transforming the material conditions of contemporary capitalism must not
mistake a situation of crisis for the collapse of capitalist relations of domination.
As Friedrich Pollock once remarked, albeit in a different historical context: 'What
is coming to an end is not capitalism but its liberal phase'.lll This may be a more
fruitful way of looking at current realities than the rather dubious attempts to
develop modes of political action which are premised on the continued existence of
a liberal-democratic state.
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